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Abstract
Coups detat continue to be common around the world, often leading to changes in
leaders and institutions. We examine the relationship between military spending and
coups and nd that (i) successful coups increase military spending by more than failed
attempts, and (ii) coups are more likely when military spending as a share of GDP
is relatively low. Our identication strategy exploits the conditional independence
between a coups outcome and the change in military spending that follows it. We
interpret this as evidence that the military may stage coups in order to increase its
funding, and rule out several alternative mechanisms.
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1 Introduction
There is a growing consensus that political institutions and leadership matter for economic
outcomes.1 Political transitions and leadership changes often take place through coups detat,
but coups remain a little understood political phenomenon. With the exception of Londregan
and Poole (1990), who show that low income per capita is correlated with a higher incidence
of coups, the relationship between economic variables and coups has not been explored in
detail.
In this paper we examine the relationship between military spending and coups.2 Po-
litical scientists have long argued that low military spending may trigger coups, as in the
case of the 1966 coup in Ghana. To justify his participation in this coup, Colonel A. A.
Afrifa claimed that "the army was rendered incapable, ill-equipped, [having] virtually been
reduced to a rabble. By Christmas 1965 a number of our troops were without equipment and
clothing, things essential for the pride, morale and e¢ ciency of the soldier... It was shameful
to see a Ghanaian soldier in a tattered and ragged uniform, sometimes without boots during
his training period" (Afrifa, 1966). Furthermore, governments can use military spending to
buy o¤the military and keep it from staging coups. Nordlinger (1977) cites the example of
President Romulo Betancourt in Venezuela, who "managed to serve out his entire constitu-
tional term of o¢ ce - the rst time this had occurred in that countrys military-dominated
history - by providing the o¢ cers with the best salaries, rapid promotions, and a generous
allotment of fringe benets" (p.70). Recent economic models of the military by Acemoglu,
Ticchi and Vindigni (2010), Besley and Robinson (2010) and Leon (2009) assume that the
military can be bought o¤ through greater military spending.3
We establish two empirical facts: (i) successful coups result in greater increases in military
1For example, see the seminal papers by Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) and Jones and Olken
(2005).
2We dene coups as attempts to overthrow the government by a group within the military, which rules
out overthrows in which the military does not participate. As it will become clear later, coups are quite
distinct from civil wars.
3In theory, military spending could a¤ect a coups likelihood of success through its impact on its ghting
capability. We later show empirical evidence that suggests that this is not the case.
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spending than failed coups, and (ii) coups are more likely when military spending as a share
of GDP is relatively low. For this we use data for 153 countries for the period 1963-1999,
which includes coups, information on whether they succeeded or failed, military spending,
and other country level variables. The coup data comes from Belkin and Schofer (2003),
which is one of several coup datasets available, and the best suited for our purposes. The
data on military spending and on the size of the military comes from the U.S. Arms Control
and Disarmament Agency, which is widely regarded as one of the most complete sources of
historical military spending data and the best in terms of within country consistency.
The main di¢ culty in studying coups empirically is that the variables that determine
whether coups happen, including military spending, can also be a¤ected by coups. This
will be the case, for example, if the government fears that a coup is about to take place and
adjusts military spending in an attempt to prevent it. To deal with this endogeneity problem
we initially limit our attention to cases in which coups occurred, comparing the impact of
success and failure on military spending; this allows us to establish empirical fact (i). This
approach is analogous to treating the outcome of a coup as a natural experiment, creating
a control group of failed coups and a treatment group of successful coups, and is similar to
the strategy used by Jones and Olken (2009) to study the impact of assassinations.4 Our
identifying assumption is that the outcome of a coup is independent from the post-coup
change in military spending, conditional on all relevant observable variables. This allows us
to use di¤erence in di¤erences estimation to test for whether successful coups have a di¤erent
impact on military spending than failed coups. We check for the validity of our identication
assumption in several ways. First, we plot the trends in military spending around the time
of a coup, for both successful and failed coups, and see that the trends are quite similar. We
then divide the coups into two groups, successful and failed, and compare the group sample
means for each variable evaluated on the year before the coup. We nd no di¤erence except
4As part of their seminal research on leadership, Jones and Olken (2009) use the outcome of assassination
attempts to estimate the impact of changes in leadership on institutions and war. They restrict their sample
to cases in which the weapon was used, so that the outcome of the assassination attempt can be taken as
random.
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that mean average military spending (as a fraction of GDP) before a successful coup is lower
than that before a failed coup, suggesting that greater military spending does not improve
a coups probability of success. We also regress a coups outcome on a number of controls
evaluated the year before the coup, to see whether any of these variables is a good predictor
of a coups outcome; none of these variables predict the success or failure of coup attempts.
We compare military spending before and after each coup, and nd that successful and
failed coups di¤er signicantly in their impact on military spending, with successful coups
leading to changes in military spending that are about 25% greater than the changes following
failed coups. We nd that the e¤ect is entirely due to changes following successful coups
against non-democracies; changes in military spending following a successful coup against
democracy are indistinguishable from those following a failed coup. To further deal with
the concern that unobservables may a¤ect both coup outcome and the changes in military
spending that follow a coup, we re-run our regressions using only coups that resulted in
casualties. Our reasoning is that these are coups where the outcome is likely to have been
uncertain ex-ante, and so where systematic di¤erences in unobservables are less likely. Our
results are stronger when we focus on this reduced sample.5
In order to establish fact (ii) we estimate a panel specication that looks at whether
military spending is correlated with the incidence of coups.6 We use xed e¤ects to control
for time-invariant country characteristics (e.g. institutions) that can a¤ect income, mili-
tary spending and coups. We nd a negative and signicant relationship between military
spending and coups: within a country, years with lower military spending are followed by
years when the probability of a coup is higher. For the average country-period pair, we nd
that increasing military spending as a share of GDP by one percentage point leads to a 1.5
percentage point decline in the probability of a coup in that 5 year period (where the mean
5We look at a number of other variables one and three years after a coup, and check whether the means
di¤er signicantly depending on the coups outcome. We nd no signicant di¤erence across success and
failure except in institutions. This suggests that other policies and outcomes do not change di¤erentially
depending on a coups outcome.
6This section focuses on correlations (rather than causal statements) and so the conclusions are more
tentative.
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is 18%). To put this into context, a one standard deviation increase in military spending
lowers the probability of a coup in the following ve years in the average country-period pair
from 18% to 8%.7
Our results are consistent with the view that military spending matters for coups: coups
are more likely when military spending is low relative to a countrys average, and successful
coups are followed by larger increases in military spending than failed coups. We argue that
one plausible explanation for this is that coups against non-democracies are often staged by
militaries that wish to increase military spending, while that is not the case for coups against
democracy. These ndings also lend support to the argument that the military may overlook
other reasons to stage a coup when it is being paid enough. Nordlinger (1977) claims that
this is exactly what happened in Venezuela, where generous military allowances funded by
oil revenue allowed Romulo Betancourt to avoid a coup "despite the adoption of expensive
agrarian reforms and development programs" (p.70). Conversely, low military spending may
lead to a coup regardless of whether other causes are present. This is consistent with the
experience of Peru between 1912 and 1964, when "every civilian government that reduced
the proportion of the national budget assigned to the Peruvian military was overthrown, and
this despite the continual increases in the absolute size of military expenditures" (p.67).
There are a number of alternative mechanisms that could connect military spending and
coups, and our ndings allow us to refute a number of them. Two of these alternatives,
which would also undermine our identication strategy, are that (a) the coup plotters talent
or ambition impacts on the success but also on changes in military spending, and that (b)
there might be expected shocks to income that a¤ect both a coups likelihood of success
and military spending. We consider a number of other alternatives: (c) successful coups are
followed by more repression and this requires increased military spending, (d) the results
7We also nd that income measures have a signicant negative relationship with coups when no xed
e¤ects are included, which is consistent with the literature (e.g. Londregan and Poole, 1990). However, this
result vanishes when we introduce xed e¤ects, suggesting that income per capita may be acting as a proxy
for unobserved country-specic and time-invariant factors like institutions. The coe¢ cient for the income
measures is positive but insignicant, so that there is no evidence linking income to the likelihood of coups.
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are driven by decreases in military spending following failed coups (e.g. the government
punishes the military), (e) the military is opportunistic so that military spending goes up
after a successful coup even if that was not the motivation for it, and (f) low military spending
may be a reection of a small military that can more easily coordinate. We show that none
of these alternatives is consistent with both of our empirical ndings.
This paper contributes to the literature on political transitions that originates with the
seminal work of Acemoglu and Robinson (2001, 2005). Its main contribution is to study
coups empirically, and it is closely related to a small but growing theoretical literature on
the military and its role in political transitions. Acemoglu, Ticchi and Vindigni (2010) show
the circumstances under which the military may rebel against the elite, stage a coup, and
establish a military dictatorship. In their model, an elite may pay the military high wages
to avoid coups. Besley and Robinson (2010) look at the optimal size of the military, and
conclude that a government may choose to pay it an e¢ ciency wage in order to avoid coups.
Leon (2009) looks at the relationship between war, coups and institutions, and shows that
there is a non-monotonic relationship between the frequency of war and the likelihood of a
coup. Our empirical ndings lend support to a key feature of these models: that the military
may stage coups if it is not properly funded.
This paper also contributes to the literature on the economic causes and consequences
of coups, a topic that has received much less attention than the economic causes of civil
conict.8 The seminal papers in this literature are by Londregan and Poole (1990, 1996).
Londregan and Poole (1990) estimates a simultaneous equation model using time series
methods. It nds that income per capita, economic growth and coups in the recent past
are important predictors of future coup attempts. Our paper di¤ers primarily in its focus
8The literature on the economic causes of civil wars is extensive. For example, Collier and Hoe­ er (1998,
2004) and Fearon and Laitin (2003) found a correlation between economic circumstances and civil wars, while
Miguel et al. (2004) showed that income shocks could cause civil war. More recently, Djankov and Reynal-
Querol (2008) show that these correlations are spurious; while Ciccone (2011) shows that accounting for the
persistence of shocks in Miguel et al. (2004) reverses the latters results. Brueckner and Ciccone (2009)
show that commodity price shocks and recessions in trading partners can lead to civil conict; Djankov and
Reynal-Querol (2007) nd that economic institutions are key determinants of civil wars.
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on military spending and the use of a new identication strategy to deal directly with the
endogeneity problem. Collier and Hoe­ er (2005) also nd that income measures impact on
the likelihood of coups in Africa, while Collier and Hoe­ er (2007) nd that the risk of a coup
detat has a non-monotonic impact on military spending. There is a literature in political
science that is concerned with the military; classic studies include Huntington (1957), Finer
(1962), Luttwak (1969) and Nordlinger (1977). The rst agency model of the military is due
to Feaver (2003), who used it to explain civil-military relations in the United States. Belkin
and Schofer (2003) construct a coup risk measure based on past coups, the strength of civil
society, and regime legitimacy.
Our paper shows that coups against non-democracies may be motivated by greed, while
coups against democracies appear to be driven by other factors; in doing so it contributes to
the literature that seeks to understand the di¤erences between political regimes. Our ndings
are consistent with those of the cross-country study by Mulligan et al. (2004), which shows
that autocracies have higher military spending than democracies. It is also related to the
recent papers by Besley and Kudamatsu (2007) and Acemoglu et al. (2008), which show
that economic outcomes may di¤er across political regimes.
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows: section 2 describes our data, while section
3 establishes empirical fact (i). Section 4 establishes empirical fact (ii), while section 5
discusses the possible mechanisms giving rise to our empirical ndings. Section 6 concludes.
2 Data on Coups and Military Spending
We use a dataset with observations for 153 countries for the period 1963-1999, which includes
coups, their outcome, military spending, and other country level variables. The coup data
comes from Belkin and Schofer (2003). There are a number of di¤erent coup datasets, and
they di¤er across two key dimensions: on how they dene coups, and on whether they report
failed as well as successful coups. Given our interest in military spending, we want our
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denition of coups to be limited to cases in which the military is a key actor. This includes
most coups, and leaves out insurrections and coups by civilians, which are altogether very
di¤erent events. Belkin-Schofer proves the most useful because it denes coups as actions
aimed at removing the regimeby a small military coalition.Naturally, we want a dataset
that includes both successes and failures, as Belkin-Schofer does. Furthermore, the Belkin-
Schofer dataset is quite comprehensive in terms of country and time coverage.
To construct their data, Belkin and Schofer (2003) compiled a list of coups from a number
of academic articles, and complemented it with data from Keesings Contemporary Archives.
They checked the accuracy of this list by consulting regional experts and resolving conicting
cases with information from the New York Times and Foreign Broadcast Information Service.
More details can be found in Belkin and Schofer (2003). We then construct the data on the
outcome of coups (i.e. whether they succeeded or failed), for those coups in Belkin and
Schofer (2003), by using data from Banks (2001) and Powell and Thyne (2010). In a small
number of cases the outcome in Banks (2001) di¤ered from that in Powell and Thyne (2011);
in these instances we checked the outcome by looking at online news sources.
We have coup information for 4,760 country-years, with a total of 306 coups taking place
in 247 country-years, as shown in Table 1. That is, coups occur in slightly more than 5%
of our country-years. Table 2 shows that information on whether a coup succeeded or failed
is available for 232 coups, and that in almost exactly half the cases the coup succeeded.
Although coups are infrequent, Table 3 shows that close to half of the 153 countries in the
dataset experienced at least one coup between 1963 and 1999. Table 4 shows the average
number of coups by country-year, separated by region and decade. The di¤erences across
regions are stark, with countries in Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America experiencing the
most coups. Coups have become much less common worldwide: from the 1960s to the 1990s,
coups in Sub-Saharan Africa have halved while those in Latin America have decreased by
more than two thirds.
We use data on political regimes from Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland (2010), which is
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rooted in the datasets in Alvarez et al. (1996) and Przeworski et al. (2000). Like them,
Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland (2010) classify regimes into just two categories: democracy
and dictatorship. We use two of their variables: democracy, which equals 1 if the country
is democratic and 0 otherwise; and military regime, which equals 1 if the country is ruled
by the military and 0 otherwise. Table 5 shows that most coups are staged against non-
democracies. However, whether a coup succeeds or fails appears to be unrelated to whether
the target regime is democratic. Perhaps not surprisingly, the vast majority of successful
coups lead to non-democratic regimes, while most failed coups result in the regime type
remaining unchanged.
The data on military spending and on the size of the military was collected from the
"World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers" reports produced by the U.S. Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency. These are widely regarded as one of the most complete
sources of historical military spending data. Conversations with researchers at both the
International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) and the Stockholm International Peace
Research Institute (SIPRI), the main other sources for data on military spending, suggested
that the data from the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency was the best suited for
a study that looks at changes over time. The reason is that this data was collected under the
supervision of the same individual from the early 1960s to the early 1990s, ensuring some
degree of within country consistency over time.
Table 6 shows average military spending as a percentage of GDP (out of 100) by country-
year, separated by region and decade. Surprisingly, mean military spending in Sub-Saharan
Africa and Latin America has always been relatively low compared to that in wealthier re-
gions like Europe and North America. Furthermore, di¤erent regions seem to follow di¤erent
trends: spending in both Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa seems to have peaked in
the 1980s, while other regions have experienced declines since the 1970s.
We use data on GDP, population, and the allocation of countries to regions from the
World Bank Development Indicators (2009). Our data on political instability comes from
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Banks (2001); we use the weighted conict indexvariable, which is listed by Powell (2010)
as a good predictor of coup outcomes. We use data on casualties resulting from coups from
Marshall and Marshall (2010), corrected for missing values using news data we collected
from the New York Times Archive. For more details on all variables please see the appendix.
Summary statistics for all key variables are shown in Table 7.
3 Coup Outcome and Military Spending
3.1 Specication
In this section we establish our rst empirical nding: (i) successful coups increase military
spending by more than failed attempts. In order to test how successful coups impact on
military spending we need to take into account that military spending might be trending.
We need to distinguish the true impact of experiencing a successful coup from the trend,
and it is possible that trends di¤er across regions and between time periods with coups
and those without. A natural way to proceed is to follow the approach used by Jones and
Olken (2009) to examine the impact of assassinations on institutions and war. We limit
our attention to cases where coups took place, and compare instances in which the coups
succeeded with instances in which they failed. We use a di¤erence in di¤erences specication,
where our natural experiment is experiencing a successful coup; treated units are those where
a successful coup took place, while the controls are those in which the coup failed. This allows
us to estimate an average treatment e¤ect: the average impact on military spending from
experiencing a successful coup instead of a failed one.
This approach eliminates the problem caused by the possible endogeneity of coup at-
tempts. However, for us to correctly estimate the impact of successful coups on military
spending, the grouping variable (in our case whether the coup succeeds or fails), needs to be
conditionally independent from the variable of interest (military spending after the coup).
This requires that we control for selection into and out of the treatment group, so that once
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we have controlled for the factors that a¤ect a coups probability of success, we can take the
outcome of a coup to be independent from the changes in military spending that follow it.
This is the common trendscondition that allows us to use failed coups as counterfactuals:
if one of the successful coups had instead failed, military spending would have changed as
in the control group of failed coups. Figure 1 shows the trends in military spending for
successful and failed coups, both before and after the event. The trends are constructed by
tting lines through the annual average military spending for each group (without controlling
for other observables). The gure shows military spending follows a similar trend for both
successful and failed coups. This is true both before and after a coup, the main di¤erence
being that in the case of successful coups the trend is shifted upward.
In the next section we present a number of empirical tests that provide further support
for the common trends assumption. More generally, for the common trends condition to be
valid it must be that assignment, once we control for observables, is independent from the
change in military spending following a coup. There are a large number of observables that
could impact on whether coups succeed or fail. In a recent study, Powell (2010) considers
these variables and concludes that a coups probability of success is signicantly related
to political instability, regime type, soldier quality, the quantity of military personnel, and
whether the regime is military. These are measured by the Banks (2001) weighted conict
indexvariable, whether the regime is democratic, military spending per soldier, the size
of the military and whether the regime is military, respectively. We control for all of these
variables and argue that, conditional on these controls, success is independent of the changes
in military spending brought about by the coup. This requires that whether a coup attempt
succeeds cannot depend on unobservables that also impact on the change in military spending
following the coup. Possible unobservables include the coup plotters talent, which might
a¤ect whether the coup succeeds but also the plotters ability to increase military spending
afterwards; or expected shocks (e.g. to income) that may a¤ect the coups outcome but
also future military spending. However, it is unlikely that ability plays a role in the plotter
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being able or willing to increase military spending after a successful coup, and we later show
empirical evidence that helps rule out this possibility. We also nd evidence suggesting
that expected shocks are unlikely to be driving the outcome of coups. There may be other
unobservables, of course, and to deal with this possibility we repeat our estimation using
only coups that resulted in casualties. In these coups the outcome is more likely to have
been ex-ante uncertain, and so success is more plausibly unconditionally independent from
changes in military spending.
Our main specication is:
mi;t =  + 1ci;t + 2si + 3ci;tsi + 4xi;t + ui;t (1)
where m is military spending, i refers to a specic coup, and t indexes time. The year of a
coup is t = 0, with t < 0 counting the years before the coup, and t > 0 counting the years
after. The binary variable ci;t equals 0 before coup i and 1 after; the variable si equals 0 if
coup i failed, and 1 if it succeeded. The coe¢ cient 1 captures the impact of failed coups
on military spending, while 1 + 3 measures the impact of successful coups on military
spending. By looking at whether 3 di¤ers from zero we can establish whether successful
coups have an impact on military spending that di¤ers signicantly from that of failed coups.
We expect that success leads to greater increases, so that 3 > 0, where 3 is the average
treatment e¤ect:
3 = E [mjsuccess; x]  E [mjfailure; x] ;
where the identication assumption is that a coups outcome is uncorrelated with the error
ui;t in (1); that is
E [uitjxit; success] = E [uitjxit; failure] = 0:
The implication of this assumption is that once we include all relevant controls, coups that
succeed would have led to the same expected change in military spending, had they instead
failed, as coups that actually failed. The controls xi;t include the size of the military the year
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before the coup, as this may impact on the coups outcome; income per capita (or income
and population), which can a¤ect both military spending and the outcome of a coup; and
regional and decade xed e¤ects, as we know that there is substantial heterogeneity across
regions and over time (where the number of observations precludes the estimation of country
or year e¤ects). We also need to control for regime type, as it potentially a¤ects both the
coup outcome and military spending. We do this by including a dummy for whether the
regime the year before the coup was democratic, and a dummy for whether the government
was in the hands of the military.9
3.2 Results
Our identication strategy requires that we compare spending before and after coups, which
becomes problematic when coups occur in consecutive years. We drop these coups, which
reduces our sample to 157 coups, but in the appendix we report results for a second approach
in which we group coups that take place in consecutive years into a single event, and compare
spending before the rst of these coups with spending after the last of these coups.
We rst test for the extent to which the observable variables cited as determinants of a
coups outcome have a clear impact on the outcome of coups. Table 8 shows sample means for
a number of variables, evaluated for country-years in the year prior to a coup. We separate
the observations based on the coup attempts outcome, and test for whether the di¤erence
between the sample means is signicant. It is striking that most of these variables have the
same mean across groups. The one exception is military spending as a percentage of GDP,
where the mean is lower for successful coups. The fact that militaries with lower spending
are more likely to succeed suggests that spending is unlikely to a¤ect a militarys ability to
stage successful coups. However, we should interpret this result with caution because it does
not arise when military spending is measured in levels, and it is based on a cross-country
average.
9Not all non-democracies are military regimes; for example, there are a large number of civilian autocra-
cies.
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We also look at whether these variables can predict the outcome of a coup. We do this
by estimating the following specication:
si =  + 1mi; 1 + 2xi; 1 + "i;0. (2)
The idea is to see whether these variables, either on their own or jointly, can help predict
the outcome of a coup. Table 9 presents the results. In columns 1-4 we show estimates
of a linear probability model where the dependent variable is the binary coup outcome: 1
if the coup succeeded, and 0 otherwise. On the right hand side we include a measure of
military spending, a number of controls, and region and decade xed e¤ects. We nd that
all of the coe¢ cients are insignicant, with the exception of the log of income per capita in
column 1. In all four columns we can easily reject the null hypothesis that the coe¢ cients
(excluding the xed e¤ects) are jointly signicant. Again, we should note that military
spending appears to have no impact on a coups outcome. In order to account for the binary
nature of the dependent variable, in columns 5-8 of Table 9 we show the results of logit
regressions. We again nd that none of the coe¢ cients is signicant with the exception of
the log of income per capita in column 5. An F-test cannot reject the null hypothesis of all
coe¢ cients (excluding the xed e¤ects) being jointly equal to zero. These results suggest
that a coups outcome is exogenous with respect to these observable variables evaluated the
year before the coup takes place.10 Although in what follows we control for these variables,
there is no compelling evidence that they impact on the outcome of a coup.
Table 10 presents our main results on how a coups outcome impacts on military spending.
Columns 1-3 use military spending as a fraction of GDP, measured between 0 and 100, as
the dependent variable. In all three cases the post-coup dummy 1, which captures the
impact of failed coups on military spending, is negative; the success dummy 2, which shows
10This is somewhat at odds with the results in Powell (2010), who found these variables to be the only
signicant determinants of a coups outcome. Powells (2010) results use a di¤erent sample of coups, di¤erent
denitions for some of the variables, and are based on Heckman Probit estimation; it is unclear whether they
are robust to using alternative specications or estimation techniques.
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the di¤erence between the success and failure groups before the coup, is also negative. The
impact of successful coups, measured by 1 + 3, is positive but insignicant. However, the
only e¤ect we can identify is the interaction captured by 3, which is the di¤erence between
the impact of successful and failed coups on military spending. In all cases it is positive and
signicant. The estimated di¤erence in the rst column is 1.4 percentage points; in columns
2 and 3 it is around 0.8 of a percentage point. This di¤erence is quite large, considering that
mean military spending in the year prior to a coup for countries where the coup succeeds is
3.05; this di¤erence is over 25% of the initial value of military spending. Interestingly, the
political variables democracy, military regimeand instabilityare largely insignicant.
In columns 4-6 we repeat the regressions but use the log of military spending in levels
as the dependent variable. We do this because the e¤ect we found could be generated
mechanically if successful coups lead to greater drops in GDP than failed attempts, thus
resulting in a larger increase in military spending as a fraction of GDP. The new coe¢ cients
have the same signs as before, and are signicant except in column 4 where controls and
xed e¤ects are excluded. The impact is a 7.7% increase in military spending from success
in column 4, and over 25% in columns 5 and 6. The magnitude of this e¤ect is substantial,
and similar in size to that estimated in columns 2 and 3. Overall, Table 10 shows that
successful coups lead to changes in military spending that are greater than those following
failed coups.11
Table 11 shows the results when we restrict our sample to coup attempts that resulted
in casualties. All coups with non-zero casualty counts are included; we do not make use
of the number of deaths because sometimes they are reported as approximations (e.g. "40-
50 dead") and sometimes no numbers are given (e.g. "heavy casualties were reported").
The coe¢ cients are of a larger magnitude, and their signs are the same as before, with the
11In table A1 we show the results when we include coups in consecutive years. We count these coups as
one event, so that the pre-coup year is the one before the rst coup, and the post-coup year is the rst after
the last coup. If any of these coups succeeded we treat the event as successful. We also include a control
variable equal to the number of years included in the event. Again we nd a signicant di¤erence in the
change in military spending depending on a coups outcome.
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di¤erence in the change in military spending across successful and failed coups still being
signicant.12
Table 12 and 13 repeat these estimations but focusing only on coups against democracies
and non-democracies, respectively. As table 12 makes clear, coups against democracies do
not lead to greater increases in military spending after success; the coe¢ cients are small and
insignicant.13 In table 13, on the other hand, the result is still present, and the coe¢ cients
are now larger. This suggests that the impact we found in Table 10 is driven by coups
against non-democracies and is evidence of an important di¤erence between these two types
of regime: although it seems plausible that coups may be staged against non-democracies in
order to increase military spending, this does not appear to be the case for democracies.
Table 14 compares the means of the main control variables the year before and the year
after the coup, separating successful from failed coups. Only the institutional measures show
signicant di¤erences in political regimes, something that is not surprising given that most
successful coups lead to non-democratic regimes. The means for all other variables are not
signicantly di¤erent, suggesting that other policies are not a¤ected by the coups outcome.14
12In table A2, columns 1-4 repeat the estimation but include data from three years before and three years
after a coup. This enables us to better estimate the trends in the data, but the number of coups goes down
to 80. (We cluster the standard errors to correct for serial autocorrelation, as suggested in Bertrand, Duo
and Mullanaithan (2004).) Once again, we nd that successful coups lead to changes in military spending
that are greater than the changes following failed coups. These results are signicant in columns 1, 2 and
4 (and the p-value for the interaction term in column 3 is 0.11). The estimated magnitudes are similar:
roughly 1 percentage point in columns 1 and 2 and over 30% in columns 3 and 4. This suggests that little is
lost by using only data from the year before and the year after a coup. In columns 5-8 we allow for regional
time trends to check whether our results are due to us picking up the impact of di¤erent regional trends,
rather than that of successful coups. We nd that our estimates remain largely unchanged once we include
regional time trends.
13We should note, however, that the number of observations is relatively small.
14Table A3 replicates this table but looking at the means 3 years before and 3 years after a coup.
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4 Military Spending and Coup Attempts
4.1 Specication
In this section we establish our second empirical nding: coup attempts are more likely when
military spending as a share of GDP is relatively low. If our hypothesis is correct and coups
are staged in order to increase military spending, we would expect that a country is more
likely to experience a coup when it sets its military spending relatively low. This suggests
that a panel specication with xed e¤ects would be a natural framework to use, and we
regress a measure of coups on military spending, income and a number of control variables:
coupit =  + 1milexpit 1 + 2incomeit 1 + 3controlsit 1 + t +  i + "it (3)
where i indexes the country and t indexes time, t are year dummies,  i are country dummies
and "it is the error term. The variable coupit measures whether there is a coup attempt
(regardless or whether it succeeded or failed) in a ve year period; it equals 1 if there was
at least one coup in the 5 year period, and 0 otherwise. There are seven periods: 1965-
1969, 1970-1974, 1975-1979, 1980-1984, 1985-1989, 1990-1994, 1995-1999. The right hand
side variables are all evaluated in the year before the ve year interval begins, that is: 1964,
1969, 1974, 1979, 1984, 1989, 1994.15 Military spending is measured as a percentage of
GDP, and income is GDP per capita or GDP and population. We control for the size of the
military, whether the regime is democratic, whether it is military, and for instability. This
specication is based on a growth regression and is in the spirit of that used by Londregan
and Poole (1990).
We include country xed e¤ects to take account of the possible omitted variable bias
a¤ecting the estimated relationship between coups, income and military spending. One
likely source of bias is the omission of country-specic characteristics (e.g. institutions) that
15The results are similar if we shift the start of the ve year periods one year backwards or forward. The
year dummies are for these seven years.
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may be driving coups and military spending in opposite directions.16 In recent years new
evidence has come to light suggesting that existing cross-country correlations disappear once
xed e¤ects are included.17 The xed e¤ects transformation implies that we identify the
e¤ect of income and military spending on coups from within country variation only. We lag
the right hand side variables to reduce the possibility of simultaneity, as it is less likely that
coups in a given ve year period a¤ect military spending and other variables a year before
the start of that period. Regardless, these estimates should be interpreted as correlations
and not as causal relationships.
Table 15 shows the summary statistics for the data used in this section. The coups
variable, which measures whether there was a coup or not in the ve year period, has a
mean of 0.18, indicating that in roughly 18% of the 5 year intervals there was at least one
coup. The other variables are measured annually, although only in years before the 5 year
periods begin, and the means and standard deviations are similar to those in the complete
dataset.
4.2 Results
In Table 16 we show the panel results for specication (3). The rst two columns exclude
the country xed e¤ects, and we nd that the coe¢ cients on military spending and the
income measures (GDP in column 1 and GDP per capita in column 2) are negative and
signicant. The size of the military is only signicant in column 2, while the coe¢ cient on
military regime is positive and signicant in both columns. Finally, instability is positive and
signicant in both columns. These results are consistent with Londregan and Poole (1990,
1996), who showed that higher income per capita is correlated with a lower probability of a
coup.
16Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) emphasise that institutions remain unchanged through cen-
turies.
17Djankov and Reynal-Querol (2008) show that poverty is not correlated with civil conict once country
xed e¤ects are included; Acemoglu et al. (2008) show that xed e¤ects eliminate the observed cross-country
correlation between income and democracy.
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In columns 3 and 4 we introduce country xed e¤ects.18 Military spending is still negative
but the magnitude is greater, and the results are signicant at the 1% level.19 This shows
that greater military spending in the year before the start of a ve year period is associated
with a lower probability of a coup attempt in that period. Specically, a one percentage point
increase in military spending at the mean (from 4.66 to 5.66) results in a small reduction in
the probability of at least one coup in the next ve years, from 18% to 16.5%. However, the
result is substantial when we consider a one standard deviation change in military spending
(from 4.66 to 11.44), which would imply a decrease from 18% to 8%. Of course, a one
standard deviation increase in this case is substantial, but the large di¤erences in military
spending that we observe in practice can explain an important part of the di¤erences in the
incidence of coups. In columns (5) and (6) we run conditional logit regressions to check for
the robustness of the result, although in this case we lose about half the countries in the
dataset since they do not experience any coups in the sample period.
A surprising result is that income has no impact on coups once xed e¤ects are included.20
It is also interesting that the size of the military and the type of regime (whether democratic
or whether a military dictatorship) lose their predictive power once country xed e¤ects are
included. Only instability remains signicant, with its coe¢ cient largely unchanged.21
These results are robust to changing the years used to construct the ve year intervals
(i.e. starting in 1964 or 1966), and to including a lagged dependent variable, in this case
coups in the preceding ve year period.22 In Table 17 we repeat the estimation but separate
18In both cases an F-test rejects the null hypothesis that all xed e¤ects are equal, suggesting that they
need to be included.
19This is reassuring, considering that it is common for cross-country results to vanish once xed e¤ects
are introduced.
20This would seem to indicate that income levels are not relevant once we control for country-specic
characteristics, and that the Londregan and Poole (1990) result might not be robust. We should note,
however, that these statements should be interpreted with caution because annual GDP measurements
exhibit a substantial amount of error.
21There is the concern, however, that this variable is mechanically related to coups. The results are largely
unchanged when this variable is removed.
22The coe¢ cients are insignicant and have a negligible impact on our estimates, while the inclusion of a
lagged dependent variable introduces a number of econometric complications. For example, the Nickell bias
becomes a problem. Nickell (1982) showed that a lagged dependent variable causes the parameter estimates
to be inconsistent when xed e¤ects are included.
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the impact of military spending depending on whether the country is democratic or not the
year before the 5 year period begins. We nd that the coe¢ cient on military spending in
the case of non-democracy remains as before, and that the di¤erence between democracy
and non-democracy is small and insignicant. Again income does not appear to have an
impact on the incidence of coups. In summary, the evidence in this section shows that lower
military spending within a country is correlated with an increase in the incidence of coups,
establishing our empirical nding (ii).
5 Mechanisms
Our results show that successful coups lead to changes in military spending that are greater
than those that would have taken place if the coups had instead failed. We have also shown
that there is a correlation between low within country military spending (as a share of GDP)
and the probability of a coup. There are a number of mechanisms that could generate one
or the other nding, but we argue that a plausible interpretation that is consistent with
both ndings is that the militarys desire for increased military spending is a motivation
for coups, at least when staged against non-democracies. Two of the possible alternative
mechanisms connecting military spending and coups also represent threats to identication:
(a) the coup plotters talent or ambition can a¤ect both a coups outcome and the plotters
ability to increase military spending after a successful coup, and (b) there might be expected
shocks, for example to income, that a¤ect both the outcome of a coup and changes in military
spending. Other mechanisms include that (c) after a successful coup, the new government
needs to consolidate its power through repression, which shows up as an increase in military
spending; (d) the e¤ect we nd is largely due to decreases in military spending following
failed coups, as governments that survive a coup punish their military; (e) coups are staged
for other reasons, but once in power the military acts opportunistically and increases military
spending; and (f) lower military spending reects a smaller military that can more easily
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coordinate when staging a coup.
Alternative (a) is di¢ cult to test directly because the coup plotters talent is unobservable.
However, Table 11 shows that our results are robust to focusing only on coups with casualties,
and in these the coup plotters talent is more likely to be independent of coup outcome.
Furthermore, tables 14 and A3 show that successful and failed coups do not seem to di¤er,
one and three years later, in variables like GDP, GDP per capita and political instability,
that could also be a¤ected by a coup plotters talent. Likewise, these tables seem to rule
out alternative (b), as there appear to be no di¤erences in variables where shocks could be
expected.23 Our third alternative (c) is that successful coups lead to a new regime that needs
repression to stay in power, and that this requires an increase in military spending. This
does not explain why a fall in military spending would increase the likelihood of a coup. It is
also at odds with the nding that political instability is the same across successful and failed
coups, and that the e¤ect is entirely due to autocracies; there seems to be no compelling
reason why more repression would be needed after a successful coup against a non-democracy
than after one against a democracy. Alternative (d) can be ruled out too: if military spending
falls following a failed coup because the military is being punished, there is no reason why
lower military spending before an attempt would be correlated with the likelihood of a coup.
Furthermore, it is also inconsistent with Figure 1, which shows that coups lead to an upward
shift in the military spending trend for successful coups and virtually no change for failed
coups. Alternative (e), that increases in military spending after successful coups simply
reect opportunism, cannot explain why lower military spending increases the likelihood of
a coup. Alternative (f) suggests that low military spending simply reects a smaller military
that, being able to easily coordinate, is more likely to stage a coup. This alone, however,
cannot explain why military spending goes up following a successful coup.
23Although it could be possible that successful coups lead to changes in policy that completely prevent
these shocks, this seems unlikely.
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6 Concluding Remarks
This paper studies coups detat empirically and nds evidence consistent with the hypothesis
that coups are staged by the military in order to increase military expenditures. We show that
coups are more likely after years of relatively low military spending, and that successful coups
result in increases in military spending that are signicantly greater than those following
failed coups. Naturally, a number of open issues remain. One question that follows naturally
from our results is whether the relationship we have documented between military spending
and coups has changed over the four decades covered in our sample. We have shown that
coups have become much less common in most regions of the world: is the decline in the
number of coups due to a change in the way the military responds to economic incentives?
More interestingly, is there any connection between the mechanism we have identied, how
it may have changed over time, and the recent waves of democratization? Have these new
democracies been "bought" through the provision of generous military funding, or has the
militarys role in politics changed? Democratization often has a large impact on the military,
yet its role in this process has received little attention from economists.
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Table 1: Coups 
(1963-1999) 
 Number Percentage 
Country-Years, All 4,513 94.81% 
Country-Years, 
With Coups 
247 5.19% 
Total 4,760 100% 
Notes: The coup data is from Belkin and Schofer (2003). 
 
 
Table 2: Coup Success and Failure 
(1963-1999) 
 Number Percentage 
Success 117 50.43% 
Failure 115 49.57% 
Total 232 100% 
Notes: The coup data is from Belkin and Schofer (2003), Banks (2001), and 
Powell and Thyne (2011). 
 
 
Table 3: Countries with Coups 
(1963-1999) 
 (Experienced at Least 1 Coup in this period) 
 Countries Percentage 
Yes 74 48% 
No 79 52% 
Total 153 100% 
Notes: The coup data is from Belkin and Schofer (2003). 
 
 
Table 4: Average Number of Coups 
(by Country-Year) 
 Decade 
Region 60 70 80 90 
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.1627 0.1362 0.0792 0.0810 
Latin America & Caribbean 0.1325 0.1256 0.0609 0.0435 
Europe & Central Asia 0.0119 0.0417 0.0167 0.0175 
East Asia & Pacific 0.0446 0.0663 0.0333 0.0111 
Middle East & North Africa 0.1538 0.0511 0 0.0294 
South Asia 0.0357 0.1321 0.0441 0.0714 
North America 0 0 0 0 
All Countries in Dataset 0.0983 0.0929 0.0450 0.0416 
Observations 780 1,194 1,320 1,466 
Notes: The coup data is from Belkin and Schofer (2003). Regions are as defined by the World Bank. Country-years 
for which there is no coup information are dropped. The 1960s decade only includes the years 1963-1969. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5: Coups and Transitions 
(1963-1999) 
Coup Against: 
(year before) 
Outcome: New Regime: 
(year after) 
Democracy 
48 
Success 
26 
Democracy 
1 
  Non-Democracy 
24 
 Failure 
22 
Democracy 
18 
  Non-Democracy 
2 
Autocracy 
185 
Success 
84 
Democracy 
7 
  Non-Democracy 
74 
 Failure 
87 
Democracy 
6 
  Non-Democracy 
80 
 
Successful Coups 
New Regime: 
(year after) 
Democracy Autocracy 
 8 105 
Notes: Regime data is missing for some coups. The coup data is from 
Belkin and Schofer (2003), Banks (2001), and Powell and Thyne (2011). 
The regime data is from Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland (2010). 
 
 
Table 6: Average Military Expenditures / GDP 
(by Country-Year) 
 Decade 
Region 60 70 80 90 
Sub-Saharan Africa 1.85 3.08 3.63 3.07 
Latin America & Caribbean 1.65 1.85 2.76 1.84 
Europe & Central Asia 3.40 3.44 5.23 4.97 
East Asia & Pacific 4.30 6.44 3.85 3.35 
Middle East & North Africa 7.32 13.06 14.38 12.19 
South Asia 3.25 3.08 2.99 2.86 
North America 6.00 3.78 3.93 2.69 
All Countries in Dataset 3.15 4.43 5.22 4.50 
Observations 613 1,021 1,073 1,281 
Notes: The military expenditures data is from the U.S. Arms Control Disarmament Agency’s “World Military 
Expenditures and Arms Transfers” reports. Regions are as defined by the World Bank. Country-years for which 
there is no coup information are dropped. The 1960s decade only includes the period 1963-1969. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7: Summary Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation Observations 
Coups 0.05 0.22 4,760 
Military Expenditures / GDP (Total=100) 4.47 6.53 3,988 
Military Expenditures (Millions, 2000$) 5,763 28,471 4331 
GDP per capita (2000$) 5,080 7,656 4,144 
GDP (Millions, 2000$) 145,645 636,387 4,147 
Population (in Millions) 31.55 112.11 4,678 
Size of Military (in Millions) 0.15 0.41 4,653 
Democracy 0.39 0.49 5,905 
Military Regime 0.21 0.41 5,931 
Instability 3,024 7,748 4,595 
Notes: Coups is a binary variable equal to 1 if there was at least one coup in that country-year, 0 
otherwise; Democracy is a binary variable that equals 1 if the country was democratic and 0 othewise; 
Military Regime equals 1 if the government was in the hands of the military, 0 otherwise; Instability 
measures political instability and is from Banks (2001). 
 
Figure 1: Trends in Military Spending / GDP 
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The trends are constructed by fitting lines that go through the mean military spending for 
each group in each year t, where t=0 corresponds to the year in which the coup took place. 
Negative values of t refer to years before the coup; positive values refer to years after the 
coup. 
 
 
 
Table 8: Comparing the Treatment and Control Groups 
  Comparing Successful and Failed Coups, Year before Coup 
 Failure Obs. Success Obs. Difference 
(Failure – Success) 
p-value 
(two-sided t-tests) 
Military Exp/GDP t-1 
 
4.86 
(5.38) 
55 3.05 
(2.47) 
62 1.81 0.02 
Military Exp t-1 (log) 5.32 
(1.81) 
60 4.99 
(1.81) 
66 0.33 0.30 
GDP per capita t-1 (log) 
 
6.38 
(1.14) 
51 6.23 
(.92) 
62 0.15 0.43 
GDP t-1 (log) 
 
8.30 
(1.67) 
51 8.19 
(1.70) 
62 0.11 0.73 
Population t-1  (log) 
 
1.92 
(1.14) 
64 1.95 
(1.37) 
71 -0.03 0.89 
Size of Military t-1  (log) 
 
-3.75 
(1.54) 
62 -3.82 
(1.70) 
67 0.07 0.82 
Democracy t-1 
 
.26 
(.44) 
66 .27 
(.45) 
71 -0.01 0.89 
Military Regime t-1 .41 
(.50) 
66 .34 
(.48) 
71 0.07 0.39 
Instability t-1 3.27 
(5.30) 
61 3.03 
(5.68) 
68 0.24 0.81 
Notes: Standard deviations are in parentheses. Military expenditures as a fraction of GDP and in levels are from the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Military 
expenditures and GDP are in millions of US$ (2000), GDP per capita is in US$ (2000), population and the size of the military are in millions. Democracy and Regime 
measure whether the country is democratic and whether it is ruled by a military government, respectively. Instability is measured in thousands of units. All variables are dated 
the year before the coup. 
 
 
Table 9: Predicting Coup Outcome 
 Linear Probability Model Logit 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Coup 
Success t  
Coup 
Success t 
Coup 
Success t 
Coup 
Success t 
Coup 
Success t 
Coup 
Success t 
Coup 
Success t 
Coup 
Success t 
         
Military Exp/GDP t-1 
 
-0.020 
(0.020) 
-0.021 
(0.020) 
  -0.099 
(0.094) 
-0.109 
(0.102) 
  
Military Exp t-1 (log)   -0.080 
(0.085) 
-0.094 
(0.086) 
  -0.377 
(0.379) 
-0.445 
(0.390) 
GDP per capita t-1 (log) 
 
-0.103* 
(0.061) 
 -0.029 
(0.061) 
 -0.520* 
(0.298) 
 -0.130 
(0.289) 
 
GDP t-1 (log) 
 
 -0.110 
(0.079) 
 -0.011 
(0.075) 
 -0.559 
(0.375) 
 -0.049 
(0.333) 
Population t-1 (log) 
 
 0.089 
(0.097) 
 0.058 
(0.103) 
 0.446 
(0.434) 
 0.270 
(0.458) 
Size of Military t-1 (log) 
 
0.057 
(0.054) 
0.073 
(0.103) 
0.103 
(0.096) 
0.083 
(0.107) 
0.287 
(0.249) 
0.371 
(0.465) 
0.490 
(0.448) 
0.403 
(0.476) 
Democracy t-1 
 
-0.157 
(0.181) 
-0.153 
(0.182) 
-0.072 
(0.170) 
-0.087 
(0.171) 
-0.791 
(0.862) 
-0.779 
(0.857) 
-0.354 
(0.764) 
-0.426 
(0.760) 
Military Regime t-1 -0.136 
(0.142) 
-0.135 
(0.142) 
-0.083 
(0.139) 
-0.085 
(0.139) 
-0.689 
(0.690) 
-0.686 
(0.684) 
-0.392 
(0.618) 
-0.404 
(0.615) 
Instability t-1 -0.001 
(0.013) 
-0.001 
(0.013) 
0.003 
(0.012) 
0.003 
(0.012) 
-0.006 
(0.053) 
-0.005 
(0.052) 
0.012 
(0.049) 
0.011 
(0.050) 
Region and Decade FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Test: All coefficients 
(excl. fixed effects) 
F: 0.62 
p-val: 0.71 
F: 0.53 
p-val: 0.81 
F: 0.29 
p-val: 0.94 
F: 0.28 
p-val: 0.96 
Chi2(6): 3.46  
p-val: 0.75 
Chi2(7): 3.45  
p-val: 0.84 
Chi2(6): 1.74 
p-val: 0.69 
Chi2(7): 1.95  
p-val: 0.96 
Observations (# of coups) 99 99 100 100 99 99 100 100 
R-squared / Pseudo R2 0.17 0.17 0.13 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.10 0.10 
Notes: *significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, *** at the 1% level. Standard errors in columns (1)-(4) are clustered by country and reported in parenthesis. Standard errors in 
columns (5)-(8) are bootstrapped. Coup Success is a binary variable that equals 1 if the coup succeeded and 0 if it failed. Military Exp / GDP is measured between 0 and 100, Military 
Exp and GDP are measured in millions of US$ (2000), GDP per capita is in US$ (2000), population and the size of the military are in millions. Democracy equals 1 if the country was 
democratic and 0 otherwise; Military Regime equals 1 if the government was in the hands of the military, 0 otherwise. Instability is measured in thousands. 
Table 10: Difference in Differences 
(One Year Before and After) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Military 
Exp/GDP 
Military 
Exp/GDP 
Military 
Exp/GDP 
Military Exp 
(log) 
Military Exp 
(log) 
Military Exp 
(log) 
Post-Coup  dummy (β1) -0.421** 
(0.374)
-0.490* 
(0.287)
-0.386 
(0.288) 
-0.012 
(0.161)
-0.106 
(0.097)
-0.135 
(0.092)
Success dummy (β2) -1. 815** 
(0.807) 
-0.672 
(0.469) 
-0.635 
(0.446) 
-0.334 
(0.344) 
-0.163 
(0.131) 
-0.167 
(0.117) 
Post_Coup x Success 
 Dummies (β3) 
1.438** 
(0.686) 
0.812** 
(0.370) 
0.740* 
(0.382) 
0.077 
(0.218) 
0.251** 
(0.124) 
0.271** 
(0.120) 
GDP per capita (log)  -1.122*** 
(0.397) 
  0.293*** 
(0.087) 
 
GDP (log)   -1.559*** 
(0.420) 
  0.421*** 
(0.079) 
Population (log)   -0.026 
(0.548) 
  0.026 
(0.113) 
Size of Military t-1 (log)  0.558*** 
(0.179) 
1.668*** 
(0.446) 
 0.949*** 
(0.058) 
0.633*** 
(0.092) 
Democracy t-1 
 
 -1.885** 
(0.896) 
-1.295 
(0.797) 
 0.106 
(0.170) 
-0.053 
(0.154) 
Military Regime t-1  -1.130 
(0.693) 
-0.944 
(0.570) 
 0.020 
(0.124) 
-0.027 
(0.128) 
Instability t-1  -0.017 
(0.034) 
-0.004 
(0.034) 
 0.010 
(0.009) 
0.007 
(0.008) 
Region and Decade FE NO YES YES NO YES YES 
Δ after Successful Coup (β1 + β3) 1.017 0.322 0.354 0.065 0.145 0.136 
Test: Successful Coup not 0 0.33 (0.567) 0.11 (0.740)  0.06 (0.809) 0.68 (0.412) 0.46 (0.501)  0.86 (0.359)  
Observations 243 194 194 257 196 196 
R-squared 0.022 0.383 0.444 0.007 0.896 0.910 
Notes: *significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, *** at the 1% level. Standard errors are clustered by country and reported in parenthesis. Military 
Exp / GDP is measured between 0 and 100, Military Exp and GDP are in millions of US$ (2000), GDP per capita is in US$ (2000), population and the size 
of the military are in millions. Instability is measured in thousands. Test is an F-test, with the F-statistic followed by the p-value in parenthesis. 
Table 11: Difference in Differences: Coups with Reported Deaths 
(One Year Before and After) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Military Exp/GDP Military Exp/GDP Military Exp (log) Military Exp (log) 
Post-Coup  dummy (β1) -0.819 
(0.597) 
-0.688 
(0.590) 
-0.178 
(0.192) 
-0.245 
(0.199) 
Success dummy (β2) -1.063 
(0.643) 
-0.690 
(0.601) 
-0.150 
(0.309) 
-0.343 
(0.236) 
Post_Coup x Success 
 Dummies (β3) 
1.679* 
(0.853) 
1.589* 
(0.800) 
0.522** 
(0.245) 
0.566** 
(0.271) 
GDP per capita (log) -0.582 
(0.600) 
 0.563** 
(0.214) 
 
GDP (log)  -0.736 
(0.512) 
 0.662*** 
(0.158) 
Population (log)  -0.377 
(0.622) 
 -0.065 
(0.205) 
Size of Military t-1 (log) 0.964*** 
(0.203) 
1.664*** 
(0.403) 
0.990*** 
(0.094) 
0.599*** 
(0.103) 
Democracy t-1 
 
-0.884* 
(0.657) 
-0.268 
(0.723) 
0.221 
(0.326) 
-0.099 
(0.248) 
Military Regime t-1 -0.122 
0.567 
-0.041 
(0.495) 
0.146 
(0.258) 
0.117 
(0.178) 
Instability t-1 -0.145** 
(0.062) 
-0.140** 
(0.054) 
0.006 
(0.016) 
0.007 
(0.017) 
Region and Decade FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Δ after Successful Coup (β1 + β3) 0.86 0.901 0.344 0.321 
Test: Successful Coup not 0 2.38 (0.136) 3.14 (0.089) 5.20 (0.031) 3.38 (0.078) 
Observations 60 60 62 62 
R-squared 0.671 0.713 0.884 0.911 
Notes: *significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, *** at the 1% level. Standard errors are clustered by country and reported in 
parenthesis. Military Exp / GDP is measured between 0 and 100, Military Exp and GDP are in millions of US$ (2000), GDP per capita is in US$ 
(2000), population and the size of the military are in millions. Democracy equals 1 if the country was democratic and 0 otherwise; Military 
Regime equals 1 if the government was in the hands of the military, 0 otherwise. Instability is measured in thousands. Test is an F-test, with the 
F-statistic followed by the p-value in parenthesis.
Table 12: Difference in Differences, Democracies 
(One Year Before and After) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Military 
Exp/GDP 
Military 
Exp/GDP 
Military 
Exp/GDP 
Military Exp 
(log) 
Military Exp 
(log) 
Military Exp 
(log) 
Post-Coup  dummy (β1) 0.649* 
(0.351)
0.381 
(0.301)
0.469 
(0.295) 
0.436*** 
(0.145)
0.181* 
(0.101)
0.137 
(0.099)
Success dummy (β2) 0.104 
(0.690) 
-0.947* 
(0.529) 
-1.015** 
(0.460) 
0.177 
(0.608) 
-0.350* 
(0.191) 
-0.312* 
(0.167) 
Post_Coup x Success 
 Dummies (β3) 
-0.320 
(0.534) 
0.001 
(0.442) 
-0.044 
(0.423) 
-0.327 
(0.206) 
0.068 
(0.147) 
0.077 
(0.147) 
GDP per capita (log)  0.610 
(0.434) 
  0.985*** 
(0.121) 
 
GDP (log)   0.462 
(0.286) 
  1.065*** 
(0.111) 
Population (log)   -1.770*** 
(0.384) 
  -0.537*** 
(0.156) 
Size of Military t-1 (log)  0.556** 
(0.239) 
1.480*** 
(0.336) 
 0.937*** 
(0.060) 
0.561*** 
(0.104) 
Democracy t-1 
 
      
Military Regime t-1       
Instability t-1  -0.026 
(0.019) 
-0.024* 
(0.018) 
 0.005 
(0.007) 
0.003 
(0.006) 
Region and Decade FE NO YES YES NO YES YES 
Δ after Successful Coup (β1 + β3) 0.329 0.382 0.425 0.109 0.249 0.214 
Test: Successful Coup not 0 0.14 (0.713) 2.42 (0.135) 5.24 (0.033) 0.07 (0.797) 2.61 (0.121) 1.96 (0.177) 
Observations 63 63 63 63 63 63 
R-squared 0.024 0.487 0.601 0.009 0.932 0.949 
Notes: *significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, *** at the 1% level. Standard errors are clustered by country and reported in parenthesis. Military 
Exp / GDP is measured between 0 and 100, Military Exp and GDP are in millions of US$ (2000), GDP per capita is in US$ (2000), population and the size 
of the military are in millions. Instability is measured in thousands. Test is an F-test, with the F-statistic followed by the p-value in parenthesis. 
Table 13: Difference in Differences, Non-Democracies 
(One Year Before and After) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Military 
Exp/GDP 
Military 
Exp/GDP 
Military 
Exp/GDP 
Military Exp 
(log) 
Military Exp 
(log) 
Military Exp 
(log) 
Post-Coup  dummy (β1) -0.907* 
(0.479)
-0.812** 
(0.396)
-0.697* 
(0.383) 
-0.098 
(0.202)
-0.239* 
(0.124)
-0.256** 
(0.122)
Success dummy (β2) -2.519** 
(1.029) 
-0.724 
(0.659) 
-0.505 
(0.609) 
-0.554 
(0.392) 
-0.126 
(0.156) 
-0.147 
(0.140) 
Post_Coup x Success 
 Dummies (β3) 
2.098** 
(0.860) 
1.082** 
(0.504) 
0.953* 
(0.510) 
0.220 
(0.273) 
0.333* 
(0.170) 
0.351** 
(0.168) 
GDP per capita (log)  -1.153** 
(0.453) 
  0.188** 
(0.080) 
 
GDP (log)   -1.915*** 
(0.503) 
  0.300*** 
(0.083) 
Population (log)   -0.333 
(0.640) 
  0.013 
(0.109) 
Size of Military t-1 (log)  0.439* 
(0.229) 
1.983*** 
(0.604) 
 0.917*** 
(0.063) 
0.697*** 
(0.104) 
Democracy t-1 
 
      
Military Regime t-1  -1.047 
(0.688) 
-0.834 
(0.501) 
 0.006 
(0.112) 
-0.018 
(0.110) 
Instability t-1  0.193 
(0.071) 
0.219*** 
(0.054) 
 0.058 
(0.016) 
0.056*** 
(0.016) 
Region and Decade FE NO YES YES NO YES YES 
Δ after Successful Coup (β1 + β3) 1.191 0.270 0.256 0.122 0.094 0.095 
Test: Successful Coup not 0 0.24 (0.624) 0.34 (0.561) 0.54 (0.466) 1.16 (0.286) 1.94 (0.171) 2.11 (0.154) 
Observations 180 131 131 194 133 133 
R-squared 0.031 0.510 .605 0.018 0.890 0.898 
Notes: *significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, *** at the 1% level. Standard errors are clustered by country and reported in parenthesis. Military 
Exp / GDP is measured between 0 and 100, Military Exp and GDP are in millions of US$ (2000), GDP per capita is in US$ (2000), population and the size 
of the military are in millions. Instability is measured in thousands. Test is an F-test, with the F-statistic followed by the p-value in parenthesis. 
Table 14: Comparing the Treatment and Control Groups 
  Comparing Successful and Failed Coups 
Two-Sided t-tests 
Year before Coup 
Comparing Successful and Failed Coups 
Two-Sided t-tests 
Year after Coup 
 Failure Obs Success Obs Difference p-value Failure Obs Success Obs Difference p-value 
GDP per capita (log) 
 
6.38 
(1.14) 
51 6.23 
(.92) 
62 0.15 0.43 6.40 
(1.20) 
54 6.26 
(.941) 
66 0.15 0.45 
GDP (log) 
 
8.30 
(1.67) 
51 8.19 
(1.70) 
62 0.11 0.73 8.38 
(1.76) 
54 8.14 
(1.58) 
66 0.24 0.43 
Population (log) 
 
1.92 
(1.14) 
64 1.95 
(1.37) 
71 -0.03 0.89 2.00 
(1.19) 
69 1.93 
(1.27) 
75 0.08 0.71 
Size of Military 
(log) 
 
-3.75 
(1.54) 
62 -3.82 
(1.70) 
67 0.07 0.82 -3.59 
(1.56) 
67 -3.86 
(1.66) 
72 0.27 0.27 
Democracy 
 
.26 
(.44) 
66 .27 
(.45) 
71 -0.01 0.89 0.26 
(0.44) 
69 0.08 
(0.27) 
75 0.18 
 
0.00 
Military Regime .41 
(.50) 
66 .34 
(.48) 
71 0.07 0.39 0.42 
(0.50) 
69 0.733 
(0.45) 
75 -0.31 0.00 
Instability 3.27 
(5.30) 
61 3.03 
(5.68) 
68 0.24 0.81 2.25 
(3.84) 
68 2.70 
(3.49) 
73 -0.45 0.47 
Notes: Standard deviations are in parentheses. GDP is in millions of US$ (2000), GDP per capita is in US$ (2000), population and the size of the military are in millions. Democracy 
and Regime measure whether the country is democratic and whether it is ruled by a military government, respectively. Instability is measured in thousands of units. All variables are 
dated the year before the coup. 
 
 
Table 15: Summary Statistics 
for Panel Analysis 
 Mean Std. Deviation Observations
Coup (5 years) 0.18 0.38 885 
Military Expenditures / GDP (Total=100) 4.66 6.78 742
Military Expenditures (Millions, 2000$) 5,805 28,940 816
GDP per capita (2000$) 5,013 7526 754
GDP (Millions, 2000$) 140,799 605,254 755
Population (in Millions) 31 1.52 867
Size of Military (in Millions) 0.16 0.43 867
Democracy 0.38 0.48 1,056
Military Regime 0.22 0.42 1,056
Instability 3,217 7,170 851
Notes: Coup (5 years) is equal to 1 if there was at least one coup attempt (successful or failed) in the 5 
year period, and 0 otherwise. The periods are 1965-1969, 1970-1974, 1975-1979, 1980-1984, 1985-1989, 
1990-1994, 1995-1999.  Democracy is a binary variable that equals 1 if the country was democratic and 0 
othewise; Military Regime equals 1 if the government was in the hands of the military, 0 otherwise; 
Instability measure political instability and is from Banks (2001). All variables are dated the year before 
the a five year period starts. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 16: Military Spending and Coups (5 years) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
 Coupt Coupt Coupt Coupt Coupt Coupt
 (5 years) (5 years) (5 years) (5 years) (5 years) (5 years) 
 Cross-Country Fixed Effects Conditional Logit 
       
Military Exp / GDP t-1 -0.005** 
(0.002) 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
-0.015*** 
(0.004) 
-0.015*** 
(0.004) 
-0.143* 
(0.081) 
-0.148* 
(0.085) 
GDP per capita t-1 (log)  -0.060*** 
(0.015) 
0.001 
(0.079) 
  -0.789 
(1.123) 
GDP t-1 (log) -0.072*** 
(0.016) 
  -0.010 
(0.077) 
-0.574 
(1.201) 
 
Pop t-1 (log) 0.034 
(0.025) 
  -0.059 
(0.157) 
1.919 
(2.771) 
 
Size of Military t-1 (log) 0.006 
(0.025) 
-0.025** 
(0.011) 
0.032 
(0.044) 
0.039 
(0.051) 
0.478 
(0.501) 
0.516 
(0.414) 
Democracy t-1 0.066* 
(0.040) 
0.057 
(0.040) 
-0.106 
(0.094) 
-0.106 
(0.094) 
0.136 
(0.730) 
0.098 
(0.713) 
Military Regime t-1 0.135*** 
(0.048) 
0.137*** 
(0.048) 
-0.105 
(0.092) 
-0.106 
(0.092) 
-0.181 
(0.595) 
-0.238 
(0.649) 
Instability t-1  0.006* 
(0.003) 
0.005* 
(0.003) 
0.006** 
(0.002) 
0.006** 
(0.002) 
0.108 
(0.040) 
0.105 
(0.038) 
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Country FE N N Y Y Y Y
       
Observations 681 681 681 681 302 302 
       
Notes: *significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, *** at the 1% level. Standard errors in parentheses. All standard errors are 
clustered at the country level, conditional logit errors are bootstrapped. Coup (5 years) is equal to 1 if there was at least one coup in the 
5 year period, and 0 otherwise. The periods are 1965-1969, 1970-1974, 1975-1979, 1980-1984, 1985-1989, 1990-1994, 1995-1999.  
GDP is in millions of US$ (2000), GDP per capita is in US$ (2000), population and the size of the military are in millions. Democracy 
equals 1 if the country was democratic and 0 othewise; Military Regime equals 1 if the government was in the hands of the military, 0 
otherwise. Instability is measured in thousands of units. All variables are dated the year before the a five year period starts. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 17: Military Spending and Coups 
By Political Regimes 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Coupt Coupt Coupt Coupt
 (5 years) (5 years) (5 years) (5 years) 
 Fixed Effects Conditional Logit 
     
Military Exp / GDP t-1 -0.016*** 
(0.004) 
-0.016*** 
(0.004) 
-0.166* 
(0.092) 
-0.170 
(0.108) 
Military Exp / GDP t-1 x 
Democracy 
0.007 
(0.009) 
0.008 
(0.009) 
0.112 
(0.255) 
0.098 
(0.277) 
GDP per capita t-1 (log)  -0.0003 
(0.079) 
 -0.812 
(1.194) 
GDP t-1 (log) -0.010 
(0.077) 
 -0.572 
(1.184) 
 
Pop t-1 (log) -0.052 
(0.156) 
 3.128 
(2.951) 
 
Size of Military t-1 (log) -0.108 
(0.093) 
0.028 
(0.044) 
0.415 
(0.613) 
0.475 
(0.471) 
Democracy t-1 -0.131 
(0.104) 
-0.133 
(0.104) 
-0.181 
(0.939) 
-0.174 
(1.031) 
Military Regime t-1 -0.108 
(0.093) 
-0.107 
(0.093) 
-0.138 
(0.603) 
-0.204 
(0.598) 
Instability t-1 0.006** 
(0.003) 
0.006** 
(0.003) 
0.109*** 
(0.028) 
0.106*** 
(0.036) 
Year FE Y Y Y Y 
Country FE Y Y Y Y 
     
Observations 681 681 302 302 
     
Notes: *significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, *** at the 1% level. Standard errors in 
parentheses. All standard errors are clustered at the country level, conditional logit errors are 
bootstrapped. Coup (5 years) is equal to 1 if there was at least one coup in the 5 year period, and 0 
otherwise. The periods are 1965-1969, 1970-1974, 1975-1979, 1980-1984, 1985-1989, 1990-1994, 
1995-1999. GDP is in millions of US$ (2000), GDP per capita is in US$ (2000), population and the 
size of the military are in millions. Democracy equals 1 if the country was democratic and 0 othewise; 
Military Regime equals 1 if the government was in the hands of the military, 0 otherwise. Instability is 
measured in thousands of units. All variables are dated the year before the a five year period starts.
 
ONLINE APPENDIX 
Table A1: Difference in Differences: Including Consecutive Coups 
(One Year Before and After) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Military Exp/GDP Military Exp/GDP Military Exp (log) Military Exp (log) 
Post-Coup  dummy (β1) -0.300 
(0.258) 
-0.220 
(0.259) 
-0.070 
(0.095) 
-0.090 
(0.089) 
Success dummy (β2) -0.455 
(0.429)
-0.484 
(0.400)
-0.128 
(0.122)
-0.116 
(0.111)
Post_Coup x Success 
 Dummies (β3) 
0.774* 
(0.390) 
0.746* 
(0.398) 
0.231* 
(0.120) 
0.237** 
(0.118) 
GDP per capita (log) -1.105*** 
(0.150) 
 0.280*** 
(0.077) 
 
GDP (log)  -1.596*** 
(0.413) 
 0.403*** 
(0.073) 
Population (log)  -0.156 
(0.590) 
 0.023 
(0.117) 
Size of Military t-1 (log) 0.481*** 
(0.150) 
1.717*** 
(0.465) 
0.967*** 
(0.053) 
0.665*** 
(0.101) 
Democracy t-1 
 
-1.609* 
(0.936) 
-1.115 
(0.891) 
0.066 
(0.190) 
-0.050 
(0.177) 
Military Regime t-1 -0.777 
(0.685)
-0.786 
(0.646)
-0.030 
(0.136)
-0.026 
(0.138)
Instability t-1 -0.010 
(0.030) 
0.006 
(0.031) 
0.009 
(0.009) 
0.005 
(0.008) 
Years in Event -0.351 
(0.394) 
-0.422 
(0.310) 
-0.174 
(0.093) 
-0.155 
(0.095) 
Region and Decade FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 223 223 225 225 
R-squared 0.354 0.434 0.888 0.901 
Notes: In this table we include coups that happen in consecutive years, we group them into ‘events’ and the year before the first 
coup is the pre-coup year, while the year after the last coup is the post-coup year. *significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% 
level, *** at the 1% level. Standard errors are clustered by country and reported in parenthesis. 
Table A2: Difference in Differences (Three Years Before and After) and Regional Time Trends 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Military 
Exp/GDP 
Military 
Exp/GDP 
Military Exp 
(log) 
Military Exp 
(log) 
Military 
Exp/GDP 
Military 
Exp/GDP 
Military Exp 
(log) 
Military Exp 
(log) 
Post-Coup  dummy (β1) -0.342 
(0.284) 
-0.291 
(0.313) 
-0.038 
(0.122) 
-0.108 
(0.097) 
-0.394 
(0.768) 
-0.575 
(0.676) 
-0.376* 
(0.194) 
-0.229 
(0.155) 
Success dummy (β2) -0.372 
(0.535) 
-0.374 
(0.535) 
-0.092 
(0.189) 
-0.080 
(0.151) 
-0.586 
(0.529) 
-0.497 
(0.524) 
-0.031 
(0.221) 
-0.085 
(0.155) 
Post_Coup x Success 
 Dummies (β3) 
1.024* 
(0.564) 
0.995* 
(0.582) 
0.312 
(0.192) 
0.344** 
(0.165) 
1.249** 
(0.539) 
1.077* 
(0.541) 
0.262 
(0.196) 
0.342* 
(0.173) 
GDP per capita (log) -0.759** 
(0.326) 
 0.356*** 
(0.096) 
 -0.278 
(0.231) 
 0.333*** 
(0.088) 
 
GDP (log)  -0.884** 
(0.379) 
 0.576*** 
(0.085) 
 -0.685** 
(0.338) 
 0.595*** 
(0.078) 
Population (log)  0.449 
(0.450) 
 0.209* 
(0.114) 
 -0.288 
(0.405) 
 0.026 
(0.117) 
Size of Military t-1 (log) 0.347* 
(0.184) 
0.713 
(0.426) 
0.980*** 
(0.075) 
0.325*** 
(0.103) 
0.483*** 
(0.178) 
1.221** 
(0.510) 
0.926*** 
(0.048) 
0.463*** 
(0.100) 
Democracy t-1 
 
0.132 
(0.494) 
0.162 
(0.462) 
0.173 
(0.140) 
0.106 
(0.126) 
-0.248 
(0.764) 
0.012 
(0.587) 
0.219 
(0.154) 
0.019 
(0.136) 
Military Regime t-1 -0.234 
(0.426) 
-0.260 
(0.439) 
-0.064 
(0.186) 
-0.029 
(0.149) 
-0.496 
(0.597) 
-0.384 
(0.553) 
0.022 
(0.223) 
-0.055 
(0.164) 
Instability t-1 -0.032 
(0.028) 
-0.035 
(0.025) 
-0.006 
(0.009) 
-0.001 
(0.008) 
-0.031 
(0.024) 
-0.039* 
(0.023) 
-0.009 
(0.010) 
-0.003 
(0.008) 
Regional Time Trends and 
Decade FE  
NO NO NO NO YES YES YES YES 
Region and Decade FE YES YES YES YES NO NO NO NO 
Observations 288 288 293 293 288 288 293 293 
R-squared 0.264 0.271 0.888 0.922 0.201 0.247 0.887 0.915 
Notes: *significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, *** at the 1% level. Standard errors are clustered by country and reported in parenthesis. Regional time trends are linear
 
 
 
Table A3: Comparing the Treatment and Control Groups 
  Comparing Successful and Failed Coups 
Two-Sided t-tests 
Year before Coup 
Comparing Successful and Failed Coups 
Two-Sided t-tests 
3 Years after Coup 
 Failure Obs Success Obs Difference p-value Failure Obs Success Obs Difference p-value 
GDP per capita (log) 
 
6.38 
(1.14) 
51 6.23 
(.92) 
62 0.15 0.43 6.47 
(1.19) 
52 6.25 
(0.94) 
66 0.22 0.27 
GDP (log) 
 
8.30 
(1.67) 
51 8.19 
(1.70) 
62 0.11 0.73 8.56 
(1.78) 
52 8.22 
(1.58) 
66 0.34 0.31 
Population (log) 
 
1.92 
(1.14) 
64 1.95 
(1.37) 
71 -0.03 0.89 2.09 
(1.17) 
65 1.97 
(1.29) 
74 0.12 0.58 
Size of Military (log) 
 
-3.75 
(1.54) 
62 -3.82 
(1.70) 
67 0.07 0.82 -3.52 
(1.53) 
62 -3.75 
(1.66) 
70 0.23 0.20 
Democracy 
 
.26 
(.44) 
66 .27 
(.45) 
71 -0.01 0.89 0.25 
(0.43) 
65 0.12 
(0.33) 
75 0.13 0.05 
Military Regime .41 
(.50) 
66 .34 
(.48) 
71 0.07 0.39 0.45 
(0.50) 
65 0.69 
(0.46) 
75 -0.25 0.00 
Instability 3.27 
(5.30) 
61 3.03 
(5.68) 
68 0.24 0.81 2.13 
(3.10) 
65 2.91 
(5.06) 
75 -0.78 0.28 
Notes: Standard deviations are in parentheses. GDP is in millions of US$ (2000), GDP per capita is in US$ (2000), population and the size of the military are in millions. Democracy and 
Regime measure whether the country is democratic and whether it is ruled by a military government, respectively. Instability is measured in thousands of units. All variables are dated the 
year before the coup. 
 
Online Data Appendix
The main units of observation are (country, year) pairs.
Coup This is a binary variable that is equal to 1 if at least one coup
occurred, and 0 otherwise. It is taken from the dataset by Belkin and Schofer
(2003), where a coup is dened as an attempt to remove the regimeby a
small military coalition.
Coup Success This is a binary variable that equals 1 if at least one
coup was successful in the given (country, year). It is constructed by using
data from Banks (2001) and Powell and Thyne (2011) to determine whether
a coup was successful or not. These databases agree in all but a small number
of cases, which we conrmed by looking at online news sources.
Military Spending This variable is from the U.S. Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency. We compiled a number of annual reports with data
on military spending, the size of the military, and some country characteris-
tics. Our measure includes all military expenditures in the (country, year),
including both operational expenses (e.g. salaries) and arms purchases. The
U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency reports this data in two ways:
in millions of US dollars (2000) and as a fraction of GDP.
Size of the Military This variable is from the U.S. Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency. It is measured in millions.
GDP, Population The GDP and population variables are from the
World Bank Development Indicators (2009). GDP is measured in millions of
US dollars (2000). Population is measured in millions.
1
Democracy This variable is the democracyvariable from Cheibub,
Gandhi and Vreeland (2010) and it equals 1 if the regime is a democracy and
0 if it is a dictatorship. The Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland (2010) dataset
is rooted in the Alvarez et al. (1996) and Przeworski et al. (2000) datasets
and shares with them the classication of regimes into just two categories 
democracy and dictatorship.
Military Regime This variable is constructed from the regimevari-
able in Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland (2010). The regime variable can be
equal to parliamentary democracy, semipresidential democracy, presidential
democracy, monarchic dictatorship, military dictatorship, and civilian dicta-
torship. Our variable is equal to 1 if regimeequals military dictatorship,
and 0 otherwise.
Instability We use the variable S18F2 Weighted Conict Indexfrom
Banks (2001), which is the same used by Powell (2010). This variable is cal-
culated by giving weights to scores on assassinations, general strikes, guerrilla
warfare, government crises, purges, riots, revolutions, and anti-government
demonstrations. This variable takes very large numerical values, and so in
the regressions we measure it in thousands.
Casualties This data is from the Center for Systemic Peace database
by Marshall and Marshall (2010), complemented with data we collected from
the New York Times Archive. We coded it as a binary variable; 0 if no deaths
were reported, 1 if at least one death was reported.
In the panel section, we use the following variable:
2
Coup (5 years) - Equals 1 if there was at least one coup in the 5 year
period, 0 otherwise.
3
